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ANOTHER "POSTSCRIPT" TO "THE GROWING
DISJUNCTION BETWEEN LEGAL EDUCATION AND
THE LEGAL PROFESSION"
Harry T. Edwards*
"The Gap Between Legal Education and the Needs of the Profession,"
the subject of this symposium, is a matter about which I have had much
to say over the past two years. In the October 1992 edition of the
Michigan Law Review, I expressed my deep concern about "the growing
disjunction between legal education and the legal profession," in an
article with the same title.' My thesis was as follows:
I fear that our law schools and law firms are moving in opposite
directions. The schools should be training ethical practitioners and
producing scholarship that judges, legislators, and practitioners can
use. The firms should be ensuring that associates and partners
practice law in an ethical manner. But many law
schools-especially the so-called "elite" ones-have abandoned
their proper place, by emphasizing abstract theory at the expense of
practical scholarship and pedagogy. Many law firms have also
abandoned their place, by pursuing profit above all else. While the
schools are moving toward pure theory, the firms are moving
toward pure commerce, and the middle ground--ethical
practice-has been deserted by both....
My view is that if law schools continue to stray from their principal
mission of professional scholarship and training, the disjunction
between legal education and the legal profession will grow and
society will be the worse for it.2
Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; B.S., Cornell
(1962); J.D., University of Michigan (1965). Judge Edwards practiced law with Seyfarth, Shaw,
Fairweather & Geraldson in Chicago, Illinois, between 1965 and 1970 and served as a tenured
professor of law at Michigan Law School (1970-75, 1977-80) and Harvard Law School (1975-77).
Since joining the D.C. Circuit in 1980, he has continued to teach part-time at various law schools,
including Pennsylvania, Harvard, Duke, Georgetown, Michigan, and, most recently, New York
University.
1. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34 (1992).
2. Id. at34,41.
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The response to the article has been nothing short of extraordinary.
Indeed, the editors of the Michigan Law Review received so many strong
reactions to my article that, in August 1993, they devoted an entire
Symposium edition to the subject.3  I have been overwhelmed by
responses to my article, with letters, calls, and oral comments from law
school deans, faculty members, students, and members of the bench and
bar. Almost all of those from whom I have heard agree that the legal
community faces a significant problem.
What is the "problem" of which I speak? I recently heard from the
former dean of one of the so-called "elite" law schools, who described
the situation as follows:
[T]he problem began in the late '60s when an increasing number
of individuals who aspired to become history professors or
economics professors or philosophy professors or political science
professors or literature professors discovered that there were few, if
any, opportunities in those fields. After spending several years
doing graduate work, they finally faced reality and attended law
school.
Most of these individuals had no real interest in law or in
becoming a lawyer, but many were excellent students. As a result,
they were hired by law faculties ... in increasing; numbers. After
obtaining tenure, many of them began moving back towards their
real academic interests-philosophy, political science, economics,
history, literature, etc. This led to an explosion of interdisciplinary
work in law, as well as to an increasing rejection of the importance
of doctrinal analysis even in mainstream courses.
Today, this generation of scholars is dominant in legal
education, and their priorities hold sway. Moreover, the problem is
compounded by the fact that these very same aademics tend to
encourage only those of their students who are themselves
interested in interdisciplinary work to consider careers in academia.
And those students who are not interested in interdisciplinary work,
but are merely extraordinarily talented lawyers, shy away from a
career in the academy because they know that the kind of work that
they would be interested in doing is not valued.4
3. Symposium, Legal Education, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1921 (1993).
4. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession: A Postscript, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 2191, 2198 (1993).
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The other side of the coin with respect to the "Growing Disjunction"
is the view from the profession. The best way for me to give a sampling
of this view is to quote the managing partner of one of the largest firms
in the country, who offered the following observations in response to my
Michigan article:
Lawyers and law professors [have lost] . . . a sense of
stewardship for the law as an institution.
What appears to have changed most on the law school side since
I attended law school in the early 1970s is... the degree of active
disinterest, even disrespect and disdain, of many faculty members
at elite institutions toward the work of practicing lawyers and
judges .... Many in the academy apparently view law
practitioners as several cuts below plumbers in both the intellectual
challenge and moral utility of their work. Imbued with this view,
hundreds of law school graduates are sent forth each year to pursue
a livelihood that they are encouraged to see as redeemed only by
the lucre with which it will line their pockets, at least for awhile.
As for law practice itself, it is certainly true that its character of
life has fundamentally changed in recent years. The number of
lawyers has grown at an extraordinary pace. Law practice has
become more competitive and specialized, with an increased
emphasis on securing business, prompting the remark that it is now
"more like a trade than a profession, with an emphasis on money
and profit rather than on service and justice." With ever growing
specialization, personal horizons have narrowed, hours have
become longer, and the focus on law as an enterprise driven by the
demands of the market place has become more and more central.
Lost in both of these developments is the concept of the law as a
vocation, in which the lawyer and the law professor owe principal
duties not only to self and to client (or to student), but to the courts,
to the institution of legal rules, and ultimately to the public.5
In constructing a vision of legal education, I tend to agree with
Professor J.B. White, who has written that, in order for legal academic
work "to be of value to the law it is essential that the work in question
express interest in, and respect for, the possibilities of what lawyers and
judges do."6 Too many legal academics seem to forget that law schools
5. Donald B. Ayer, Stewardship, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 2150,2150-51 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
6. James Boyd White, Law Teachers' Writing, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1970, 1976 (1993).
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are professional schools, not graduate schools. We grant J.D.'s, not
Ph.D.'s. Upon graduation, our students are qualified to seek licenses that
are not available to persons who do not have a legal education. Thus, the
public has a right to assume that holders of these licenses have attained a
certain level of technical competence, share a cormmitment to a defined
set of ethical norms, and accept the responsibility to interpret and
practice the law in public-regarding ways. At its simplest level, law
students must learn what the law is, and how lawyers employ or enforce
the law on behalf of clients.
I do not doubt for a moment the importance of theory in legal
education. Good legal scholarship and teaching, as I envision it, is not
wholly doctrinal. Rather, in my view, a good law teacher employs
theory to criticize doctrine, to resolve problems that doctrine leaves open,
and to propose changes in law or in systems of justice. Ideally, then, a
legal scholar always integrates theory with doctrine.
Law schools are not "trade schools;" so there can be no dispute that,
in addition to theory, quality legal education also must include an
understanding of relevant interdisciplinary considerations, analyses of
social impacts (such as the effects of law on the disadvantaged), and
proposals for reform. At bottom, however, "professional education"
must focus on certain skills with respect to which a trained
"professional" can be viewed as an authority. We are professionals
because we can practice within defined legal systems performing jobs
that others in society are neither skilled nor certified to perform.
In legal education, the principal problem that I see nowadays is the
lack of a healthy balance between "impractical" and "practical" teaching
and scholarship. By "practical," I mean teaching and scholarship that is
both prescriptive, in the sense that it instructs lawyers, judges, and other
legal decisionmakers on how to resolve legal issues, and also doctrinal,
in the sense that it gives due weight to the various constraining sources
of law, namely precedents, statutes, and constitutions. The paradigm
example of "practical scholarship" is the law treatise. In contrast to the
"practical" theory employed by the "practical" scholar, the "impractical"
scholar's scholarship consists of "abstract" theory divorced from legal
doctrine-that is, divorced from the authoritative sources of law that
necessarily constrain the arguments available to a legal professional.
Not all "impractical" teaching and scholarship is bad. Indeed, certain
interdisciplinary and critical legal studies work has the potential to be
quite valuable in legal education. For example, law students will have a
better sense of their professional mission if they have some
understanding of history, literature, and philosophy; they will have a
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broader view of society's ills if they know some social science; they will
be better able to contemplate possible reforms if they reflect on
thoughtful critical legal studies; and they will be better able to perform
certain lawyering tasks if they can master some statistics, economics, and
psychology. But, law schools cannot be overweighted by teachers and
scholars whose principal interests are in areas other than the law. The
business of law is about prescriptions, not abstract reflections of the sort
indulged in many Ph.D. programs. Reflections may inform prescriptions,
but the connection cannot be lost. My objection to so-called "law-and"
scholarship is not to the relevance of the "ands" but to the idea that the
"ands" (as opposed to the "law") will become the "ends" of professional
education.
Recently, Professor Paul Carrington, formerly Dean of the Duke Law
School, sent me a copy of a letter that he had written to Judge Richard
Posner, telling Judge Posner that he had "missed the point" in criticizing
my Michigan Law Review article.' In his letter, Professor Carrington
wrote:
Law teaching is not, as you suggest, very much like breeding
salmon. Just about all the big legal ideas there are or ever will be
were known in the time of Justinian. About all we can do is
rearrange them from time to time to fit new realities. Legal
scholarship that takes leave of reality is not only useless, but is
likely the product of the kind of self-indulgence that teaches
students to disregard professional duties. Grandiosity is in this
context a cardinal sin for a law teacher. A law teacher who lays
6000 legal eggs in the hope that one will produce a great fish is not
merely a sap, but is at least mildly corrupt. Marx would have been
a lousy law teacher even if he were entirely right ....
[T]here are today more than a few teachers who, if one is to judge
by their writing, are inclined in a search for academic status to lead
their students into the wilderness and leave them there. If teachers
forsake duty to seek status, why should students not forsake duty to
seek what they want?
"Impractical" scholars often are inept at teaching doctrine, for either
lack of any practical legal experience, lack of interest in the subject
7. Letter from Paul D. Carrington, Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law, to Hon.
Richard A. Posner, Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Feb. 7, 1994) (on
file with author).
8. Id. at 1-2.
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matter, or both. And they have little sense of ethical problems in the
profession because, often, they hold practitioners in disdain. It is
therefore hardly surprising that many distinguished practitioners in the
profession are now plainly dubious of the skills of the new generation of
"theoretical" legal scholars. One such practitioner wrote to me, saying:
I dearly would love to see some of the younger "theoretical"
members of any major law faculty argue a real case in front of the
Supreme Court (sans doctrine, of course), or even argue a tough
motion before a smart [United States] District [Court] judge ....
Alternatively, I'd like to see them sit down privately with members
of the House or Senate, and answer their questions about how to
craft a fair and workable piece of legislation, based solely on
theory. If they actually tried this, maybe the dichotomy you
identified wouldn't exist any more. On the other hand, many of
them would be so bad at it that things might get worse, not better.9
There are at least two important connections between a full "practical"
education in law school and ethical practice. First, an ethical lawyer
should only advance reasonable interpretations of authoritative
texts-interpretations that are plausible from a public-regarding point of
view. As should be obvious, although some of the critics of my earlier
writings on this subject seem not to comprehend the point, "plausible"
interpretations need not simply parrot readings of the law as it is, but can
argue forcefully and persuasively for change. For example, the work of
the late Justice Thurgood Marshall and his colleagues at the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund, which culminated in Brown v. Board of
Education,'" was eminently "practical" and "ethical," yet fundamentally
changed this nation's law.
Thus, an ethical lawyer's work should be reasonably faithful to
authoritative sources of law, and to the public values they embody. This
is what law schools must teach. The doctrinal capacity-the capacity to
develop and communicate a true understanding of some legal regime-is
a necessary condition for ethical practice. In other words, to fulfill one's
ethical duty of only advancing reasonable interpretations, one first must
have received the doctrinal education necessary to be able to distinguish
reasonable from unreasonable interpretations.
Second, legal scholars must have some real understanding of practice
before they can usefully address the ethical problems of the profession.
9. Harry T. Edwards, supra note 4, at 2213 (brackets and ellipses in article).
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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On this score, a named partner in a prestigious Washington, D.C., law
firm offered the following view:
I have always thought that it is a good idea for law teachers to have
some experience in practice before they go into teaching-to have
some exposure to what goes on in the real world and how there can
be difficult and even excruciating problems of conflicts, ethics,
candor, and even civility which are beyond the contemplation of
one who has not experienced them in practice."
In any event, even without practical experience, a law professor ought
to care about the workings of the legal profession. In his letter to Judge
Posner, Professor Carrington pressed this point, as follows:
The way one teaches professional ethics is not by a course in ethics,
but by being a professional person who takes her duties to law
seriously. If as teachers we do what we can to illuminate and
improve the law, and deal with our students fairly, we have done
what we can to teach professional ethics. If instead we pursue
academic status in other disciplines and treat law as a paltry thing,
we are doing the thing most likely to encourage main-chancing.
Students, like Holmes' dog, can tell the difference between these
two activities. 2
I agree with Professor Carrington. I also agree with Professor J.B.
White when he cautions against
tendencies in modem scholarship and teaching of different kind,
which would supplant legal thought with forms of social science or
with a kind of purely political discourse. 3
I have been mostly amused by the critical articles (such as Judge
Posner's) 4 appearing in the Symposium edition of the Michigan Law
Review." My own reaction to these articles has been that most have
tended to prove my point. I was therefore gratified when I recently
received a copy of an interesting paper authored by Rudy Buller, an
Oxford-trained litigation lawyer from Canada, who is now a graduate
11. Harry T. Edwards, supra note 4, at 2215.
12. Letter from Paul D. Carrington, supra note 7, at 1.
13. James Boyd White, supra note 6, at 1976.
14. Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching and Scholarship, 91 Mich.
L. Rev. 1921 (1993).
15. See note 3 supra, and accompanying text.
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scholar and J.S.D. candidate at Columbia Law School. 1 6 Mr. Buller's
paper presents a long commentary on the Michigan Law Review
Symposium, concluding that:
The manner in which Judge Edwards' relatively straight-forward
theses have been misinterpreted by "impractical" scholars provides
some confirmation for his view that they suffer from a degree of
"ineptitude" in the understanding and application of legal
doctrine. 7
Having described the "problem" in general terms, I offer herewith my
top-ten list of its worst effects:
First, at a number of schools, faculty hiring is tilting in favor of
"impractical" scholars.
Second, course offerings have changed dramatically. Professor J.J.
White's article in the Michigan Law Review Symposium documents how
skewed faculty hirings arguably have limited advanced level offerings in
a number of practical courses. 8 My own view of student transcripts
supports this observation.
Third, too little attention in time and money is spent on written work,
clinical training, and ethics.
Fourth, we refuse to do any real "cost-benefit" analysis of what is
useful in legal education. So we continue to indulge the personal
preferences of law teachers as to what to teach. I suspect that if we ever
seriously assessed our course offerings, more high quality clinical
courses would be taught, and a large number of esoteric "seminars"
would disappear.
Fifth, too many law teachers hold the profession in disdain, and a
number of such professors are assigned to teach basic law courses in
which students likely are most impressionable.
Sixth, too many legal academics, like Dean Bollinger (who wrote an
article for the Michigan Law Review Symposium), view what
16. Rudy Buller, The Judge Edwards/Rest of the World Debate: A Microcosm of One of the
Problems in Legal Education (1993) (This paper, which is on file with the author, was originally
prepared for the Columbia Law School graduate seminar in legal education taught by Professor Peter
Strauss.)
17. Id. at 9.
18. James J. White, Letter to Judge Harry Edwards, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 2177,2181-84 (1993).
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practitioners and judges do as "mundane" and "dull, " while the obscure
work of a new breed of law scholars is viewed as "richer and more
complex. "9 This attitude is communicated to students, implicitly and
explicitly. Worst is that the attitude is not coupled with any meaningful
proposals for reform of the profession; rather, it comes (and is received)
as "we're better than you."
Seventh, legal scholarship often does not aim to serve the profession.
Eighth, "advocacy" seen by judges sometimes is horrendous.
Research, writing, and oral arguments are sometimes awful, and the
prospect of fees seems to prompt too much litigation. Most distressing,
however, is that some attorneys and their clients are too loose with the
truth in litigation.
Ninth, in my view, there is a growing inattention to the needs of the
disadvantaged.
Tenth, the law schools do not really heed the views of practitioners.
We "survey" students at the end of our courses (when they are really not
in a position to assess what we are doing). But we refuse to heed the
advice of the people we have trained once they become licensed to
practice law (in part because practitioners are viewed as less worthy).
In response to some of the conditions of which I speak, Professor
Frank Allen, the former Dean of the Michigan Law School, has argued
that
most interested observers sense that this is a period of ...
considerable peril in the intellectual life of American law schools
[T]he law school [should not] be converted into a kind of colonial
outpost of the university graduate school, an outpost in which the
faculty inmates do only those things, though often less well, that
are being done on other parts of the campus. A sense of uniqueness
of purpose and tradition should not be squandered. This, I believe,
is not a plea for narrowing legal scholarship or a wholesale return
to "traditional" legal writing (whatever that term may be thought to
mean.) Indeed, in some respects the new tendencies in legal
scholarship are more restrictive than liberating. They are
reductionist, not only in the logic and techniques often employed,
19. Lee C. Bollinger, The Mind in the Major American Law School, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 2167,2176
(1993).
Washington Law Review
but also in the attitudes they apparently spawn toward other kinds
of useful and important work.20
I, too, am deeply concerned with the intellectual life of American law
schools. In my view, if current trends continue, the gap between legal
education and the needs of the profession will only widen.
The question now is: What do we do? The ABA's "MacCrate
Report"' takes a stab at the problem, offering a number of useful
recommendations for enhancing professional development during the
law school years.' The difficulty that I have with the MacCrate Report,
however, is not with its statement of goals, but, rather, with its failure to
deal directly with the growing imbalance between practical and
impractical scholarship and teaching in legal education. The Report
seems not to comprehend that there are many academics in legal
education who would reject or ignore its goals because they do not really
view legal education as a form of professional training.
Frankly, I am not entirely sure what can or should be done to cure the
problems that I see in legal education. The underlying issues often are
laden with sharp ideological differences among law faculty members, so
resolution of these issues will not come soon or easily. My greatest
concern now is that too many students are being taught by too many law
professors who hold the legal profession in disdain and who propose
nothing to reform the profession.
While I am somewhat skeptical about the prospects for meaningful
reform in legal education-at least in the near term--I am more hopeful
about the practicing bar's capacity to change for the good. In fact, there
are already signs of change in the profession.
Not too long ago, the American Bar Association launched a major
new initiative designed to increase the availability of legal services to
those who cannot afford a lawyer. This new "law firm challenge" calls
on big-firm lawyers to devote up to 5% of their billable hours to pro
bono work. The Attorney General, Janet Reno, has endorsed the
program, and it has been reported that a number of firms have agreed to
participate. Programs like this are long overdue, for all members of our
20. Francis A. Allen, The Dolphin and the Peasant: Ill-Tempered, but Brief Comments on Legal
Scholarship, in Property Law and Legal Education: Essays in Honor qf John E. Cribbet 183, 195
(Peter Hay & Michael H. Hoeflich eds., 1988).
21. Section on Legal Educ. and Admissions to the Bar, American Bar Ass'n, Legal Education and
Professional Development-An Educational Continuum (Report of the ABA Task Force on Law
Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, 1992).
22. See id. at 330-34.
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profession ought to be willing to contribute time and/or money to
advance the public good. Such programs also will help to shift the
current emphasis in law practice away from matters focused on
marketing, commerce and profits.
Another change that law firms can make is to renew the commitment
to mentoring between senior and junior lawyers. More and more, I fear
that partners are failing to fulfill the critical responsibility of mentoring.
I hear that many young associates feel that they are treated as fungible
billing automatons, with partners seeking to squeeze out of them as many
hours as possible. This is a tragedy, because the mentoring process
should serve two critically important functions in our profession. First,
mentoring is the way that much of the technical craft of lawyering is
transferred from generation to generation; and, second, mentoring ideally
involves ongoing discussion of the moral and ethical principles that bind
our profession.
There are many other possibilities for change, but I will leave it to the
other participants in this symposium to offer additional suggestions.
CONCLUSION
In order to deal with problems that we now face, it seems to me that
the entire legal academic community must work collectively to find a
middle ground where a greater number of practical scholars flourish
alongside their theory-oriented counterparts in an environment of mutual
respect; both should contribute to an education for students that better
prepares them for practice, and both should share the fundamental belief
that scholarship that seeks to inform and guide practitioners, legislators,
other policymakers, and judges is a valuable, indeed necessary,
component of any law school's mission. Nor should the academy be the
only focus of attention. The members of the practicing bar must-if they
wish to remain in a profession-put forth a significantly greater effort
toward achieving the ideal of ethical practice, an ideal from which too
many firms and individual attorneys appear to have strayed.
In any event, there must be a better bridge between legal education
and practice. On this point, one of my critics, Professor Robert Gordon,
has correctly observed that:
The Judge seems to be arguing that both teachers and firm lawyers
have been seduced from their real vocation by the fatal attraction of
neighboring cultures: the practitioners by the commercial culture of
their business clients, the academics by the disciplinary paradigms
Washington Law Review
and prestige of theory in the rest of the university. The "deserted
middle ground" is the ground of professional practice-practical,
yet also public-minded. Perhaps without straining his thesis too far
we could ascribe to Judge Edwards a "republican" view of the legal
profession, in which legal scholars, practitioners, judges,
legislators, and administrators-despite their separate interests and
distinct roles in a division of labor-are all participants in a
common enterprise. They are, or at any rate ought to be, engaged
in trying to construct the legal system as a medium in which the
pursuit of private advantage-their own and that of their clients and
constituencies-can be aligned with some plausible conception of
the public interest.'
As I have told Professor Gordon, at least on this point, we see eye-to-
eye.
23. Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, and the "Middle Ground, " 91 Mich. L. Rev. 2075,
2076 (1993).
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